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International Trade Aspects 
of Competition Policy 
Sadao Nagaoka 
Competition policy has emerged as one of the high-priority policy issues 
in East Asian economies. Japan has strengthened its competition policy 
substantially in the 1990s,  largely in response to U.S.  demands in the Struc- 
tural Impediment Initiative (SII) talks of 1989-90,  but also within the over- 
all context of regulatory reform. Both Korea and Taiwan have also sub- 
stantially strengthened competition policy in recent years.’ Competition 
policy has emerged as an important policy issue in regional and multilat- 
eral contexts too. The action agenda adopted at the APEC Osaka meeting 
of November 1995 calls for the establishment of appropriate cooperative 
arrangements  among the  competition  policy  authorities  of  the APEC 
economies.2 A working group on trade and competition policy was es- 
tablished in the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December  1996, to 
study issues relating to the interaction between trade and competition 
policy. 
These developments reflect the increasing perception of policymakers 
that private anticompetitive behaviors may continue to constrain “market 
access,” even when official barriers created by border measures have come 
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1. The Korean Fair Trade Commission became an independent administrative agency in 
1994. Taiwan enacted the Fair Trade Law in 1991 and established an enforcement agency 
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and consultation, and development of nonbinding principles on competition policy or laws 
in APEC. 
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down.3  In fact, the most important motivation for including competition 
policy on the agenda of the next round of WTO trade negotiations seems 
to be market access concerns. However, there has been little economic an- 
alysis of how private anticompetitive behaviors can act as trade barriers4 
In fact, there seems to be much confusion as well as unwarranted views in 
this area. 
This paper addresses how competition policy is and is not important 
for international trade. In section 2.1 I conduct a simple economic analysis 
of international spillovers of anticompetitive  behavior. In section 2.2 I 
briefly review the recent development of Japanese competition policy, em- 
phasizing its international aspects. In section 2.3 I evaluate priorities for 
international cooperation in competition policy based on an assessment 
of the importance of international spillovers of competition policy. Section 
2.4 concludes. 
2.1  International Spillovers of Anticompetitive Behavior 
International concern has grown at the possibility that anticompetitive 
behavior by the private enterprises of trading partners harms trading op- 
portunities. This section assesses how trade cartels, domestic cartels, merg- 
ers, and vertical restraints can affect foreign countries through interna- 
tional trade. I omit a discussion of monopolization, including predatory 
pri~ing.~ 
2.1.1 
Trade cartels restrain international transactiom6 They include export 
cartels, import cartels, and international agreements for dividing up na- 
tional markets. Restriction  of international trade reduces global supply 
and welfare and simultaneously harms the interests of trading partners. 
This point is illustrated by figure 2.1 in the context of an export cartel 
and quantity competition. We assume here that national markets are seg- 
mented. In figure 2.1, q represents the exports of a home country and q* 
the supply of the import-competing industry of a foreign country. An ex- 
port cartel among the home firms shifts the reaction curve of the home 
Trade Cartels and International Cartels 
3. See, e.g., the economic report of the president of the United States for 1994 (Council 
of Economic Advisers 1994), as well as the report of the Group of Experts of the European 
Commission (  1995). 
4.  Exceptions are Bliss (1996) and Levinsohn (1996). See also Scherer (1994). 
5. Mergers and vertical restraints are, however, major means of monopolization. An exten- 
sive theoretical and empirical literature on dumping generally suggests that predatory pric- 
ing is a rarely used business strategy, in spite of many accusations (see Nagaoka 1995 for a 
review of the recent literature). 
6. When a trade cartel is used as a means to prevent free-riding on joint investment for 
trade promotion, it can lead to the expansion of international trade (see Dick 1992). Here 
we  focus only on “naked” trade cartels, the objective of which is to improve the terms of 
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Fig. 2.1  Economic effects of a cartel 
country inward, so that the output of the foreign firms expands (dq* > 0) 
and the market price P rises (dP >  O).’  The welfare change of the foreign 
country is given by 
(1) 
where WY  is the welfare of the foreign country, c*  is the cost of production 
of the foreign industry, and q:  is the consumption of the foreign country. 
Because of this cartel, the foreign country, on the one hand, loses due to 
terms-of-trade  deterioration since it  is an importing country  (q* - q: 
< 0), but on the other hand, it gains due to the rent-shifting effect for the 
foreign industry ((P -  c*)dq* > 0). 
The net effect of the cartel for the foreign country, however, is always 
negative as long as the export cartel is voluntary since the exporters engage 
in the cartel only if it is profitable for them, while global welfare is reduced 
by  the cartel unless the marginal cost  of the exporters is substantially 
above that of the foreign industry.8  That is, 
dW*  = (P - c*)dq* + (q* - qE)dP, 
(2)  dW*  =  d(W* + II) -  dII  <  d(W* + II)  <  0, 
where II is the profit of the home country exporters and  WY + II is the 
sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus at market equilibrium in 
the foreign market. Thus a voluntary  export cartel is clearly a beggar- 
7. Whether the price goes up or not depends on the slope of  the reaction curve of the 
foreign country. However, when the home firms foresee that the price will drop as a result of 
an export cartel, they will not engage in such a cartel. 
8. d(W  + n) = (P  -  c*)dq* + (P  -  c)dq = (P  -  c)(dq + dq*) + (c  -  c*)dq*. 58  Sadao Nagaoka 
your-neighbor policy since the home country where such a cartel origi- 
nates always gains and the foreign country 10ses.~  There exists a negative 
international spillover of nonenforcement  of competition policy against 
export cartels. Identical conclusions apply to import cartels. 
When export restraint is a part of an international agreement among 
firms for allocating markets among themselves, all countries can lose. This 
is most clear in the following symmetric case, where the home and foreign 
countries are the same size, and each country has one firm with a common 
production cost. In this case the firms can achieve a monopoly outcome 
by each completely refraining from exporting to its competitor’s market. 
The welfare of  both countries declines due to constrained supply, while 
both firms gain. 
It is important to note that the abolition  of export cartels does not 
necessarily improve welfare, given the presence of contingent protection, 
to the extent that such cartels are used to prevent the use of contingent 
protection. In particular, antidumping measures can result in stronger re- 
striction of trade since the duties ordered are often prohibitively high. As 
shown by  a recent  U.S. International Trade Commission report (1995), 
antidumping measures often result in very large reductions in exports or 
in their complete abolition, so that the trade-restraining effect  of  such 
measures can be much larger than the monopolistic reduction of exports.’O 
Thus reform of antidumping measures is necessary to ensure that the in- 
ternational restriction of export cartels leads to welfare gains. 
2.1.2  Domestic Cartels and Mergers 
Domestic Sales Cartels and Production Cartels 
When domestic and foreign markets are segmented, domestic firms can 
collude to raise their sales price in the domestic market by restricting only 
their sales in the domestic market. Since the price in the domestic market 
is not linked with that in the foreign market, the domestic sales cartel does 
not affect the equilibrium in the foreign market if the marginal cost of pro- 
duction is constant. With such a cartel, the foreign country does not suf- 
fer a reduction in import supply, while it can expand its exports. Thus the 
foreign country’s welfare definitely improves as a result of the sales cartel in 
the domestic market. 
When domestic and foreign markets are integrated, domestic firms have 
9. An involuntary cartel can reduce the profits of its members due to expansion in supply 
by outsiders (see Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds 1983). Such an outcome is very likely in the 
case where competition is Cournot, strategic substitution holds, and outsiders have signifi- 
cant market share. 
10. The fact that an export industry typically dislikes antidumping measures imposed on 
itself  also  suggests that  the  export  restrictions  imposed  by  antidumping  measures  are 
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to reduce sales in both domestic and export markets in order to raise their 
sales price. Thus the effect of such a cartel can be analyzed as the effect of 
a production cartel among domestic firms. Now we can interpret figure 2.1 
as representing the global market. When the home country is an importing 
country and the foreign country is an exporting country (q* -  q:  > 0), it 
is clear that the foreign country gains from the cartel among firms in the 
home country. It gains both from terms-of-trade improvement and from 
the rent-shifting effect for its firms, as is clear from equation (1). 
On the other hand, when the home country is an exporting country and 
the foreign country is an importing country (4* -  q:  <  0), a cartel among 
the home firms worsens the terms of trade of the foreign country, while 
the rent-shifting effect is positive for the foreign country, as in the case of 
an export cartel. The welfare of the foreign country is likely to decline 
especially when its firms are not efficient (high c*).” 
The above analysis shows that the international spillover from a domes- 
tic cartel tends to be positive. It can be negative only when the foreign 
country is a net importing country and its import price arises substantially. 
On the other hand, a domestic cartel harms the home country, and inter- 
national trade tends to amplify this effect when markets are segmented 
or it is an importing country, since it invites deterioration in its terms of 
trade. 
In spite of this clear result, policymakers often believe  that  a cartel 
abroad harms the interests of the home industry, since cartel profits are 
used to promote the cartel’s exports. According to this “profit sanctuary” 
story, high profits gained by  a domestic cartel are used to subsidize ex- 
ports, or in other words, the cartel forces domestic consumers to cross- 
subsidize exports. This view is not supported by economic analysis. Do- 
mestic industry is not going to spend profits gained in the home market 
for export promotion unless such an act is profitable by  itself. Profits in 
the domestic market may provide the means for artificial export promo- 
tion but not its motivation, so that a firm does not cross-subsidize consum- 
ers in one market using profits from another market.I2 
In the case of import protection, protection may promote exports, not 
by providing the means for cross-subsidization, but by strengthening com- 
petitiveness (Krugman 1984). Import protection shifts the global expendi- 
ture pattern in favor of the home industry, encouraging its efforts at cost 
reduction  and learning while discouraging those of the foreign industry. 
However, in the case of a cartel, the exact opposite is the case. Contrary 
11. High production costs for the foreign firms cause greater dependency on imports as 
well as low profit margins for the foreign firms. 
12. Cross-subsidization may be relevant in a regulated industry, where the regulator allows 
the regulated firm to set its price based on its costs. In such an industry the regulated firm 
has an incentive to use the assets of  the regulated business to expand into unregulated mar- 
kets because the private cost of such activity is zero. 60  Sadao Nagaoka 
to the case of import protection, a cartel shifts the market away from the 
home industry to the foreign industry (see fig. 2.1). Consequently, cost 
reduction in the home industry slows while that in the foreign industry ac- 
celerates. Thus a domestic cartel is not a substitute for import protection in 
this regard at all, and in fact, it tends to reduce the home industry’s com- 
petitiveness. 
Mergers 
Mergers among home firms have spillover effects on the foreign country 
similar to those of a combination of domestic and trade cartels, if  we 
ignore for the time being their potential efficiency effects. This is because 
a consolidated firm will have more market power in both domestic and ex- 
port markets and will restrict sales in each market. Thus a merger hinders 
exports and promotes imports if its efficiency effect is small, as pointed 
out by  Bliss (1996). As for welfare, a merger in the import-competing in- 
dustry of the home country increases the welfare of the foreign country. 
A merger in the export industry of the home country worsens the terms 
of trade of the foreign country and so can harm its welfare when foreign 
competing firms have high costs. 
A competition policy authority typically will  not allow a merger be- 
tween firms if  the merger creates a significant market power in the home 
market. Even when efficiency defenses for mergers are considered, as in 
the United States, a merger that will produce a firm of significantly greater 
market power will be approved only if it is expected to have a strong effi- 
ciency effect that can dominate the price-raising effect. Thus the regulation 
of mergers under competition policy tends to reduce (and can reverse) 
their negative as well as their positive international spillover effects. 
Downstream and Upstream EfSects of Cartels and Mergers 
Domestic cartels in such business service sectors as international trans- 
portation and international communications, which support international 
trade, have a definite constraining effect on international trade because 
they raise the cost of such trade. Similarly, cartels among distributors in a 
specific industry will  raise the consumer price of that industry, which in 
turn will reduce demand for both domestic and foreign goods in that sec- 
tor. The effect of  these cartels on the foreign country is just like that of 
tariffs on its exports (or export duties on its imported goods). Foreign 
downstream industry suffers from terms-of-trade deterioration and a de- 
cline in the amount of trade.” Thus, even if the effect of such a cartel on 
the foreign industry in a horizontal relationship with the domestic indus- 
13. The home country can also lose because the monopoly transportation, communica- 
tions, or distribution firm can raise its price beyond the level of the optimal tariff, ignoring 
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try is positive, its international effect may be negative if its effect on down- 
stream foreign industry is significantly negative. Similarly, a domestic car- 
tel can have a negative international effect if its negative effect on upstream 
foreign industry, such as foreign component suppliers, is large. 
2.1.3  Vertical Restraints 
Vertical practices may affect international trade both by  constraining 
interbrand competition and by reducing intrabrand competition. We dis- 
cuss the two cases in turn. 
Interbrand Competition 
Vertical restraints by  incumbent domestic firms may constrain entry 
and growth by both foreign and domestic suppliers when they are used to 
increase the costs of entering and doing business in the market.I4 Such 
business practices as exclusive dealing, vertical integration, and refusal to 
deal may be used for such objectives. Foreign firms will suffer sales losses 
due to such anticompetitive practices by incumbent domestic firms. How- 
ever, vertical restraints by  incumbent firms are also used to increase the 
efficiency of s~pply.’~  It is important to note that vertical restraints by in- 
cumbent firms always reduce “market access” by a new entrant, whether 
such practices reduce cost of supply by incumbent firms or increase cost 
of supply by new entrants. When the main effect of vertical restraints is to 
reduce the cost of supply by incumbent firms, global welfare tends to rise, 
even if foreign firms suffer competitive losses. 
Thus it is important to distinguish anticompetitive  vertical restraints 
from efficient ones. Market structure plays a critical role in that regard. In 
particular, the following three conditions must be simultaneously present 
for the strategy of raising a rival’s cost to be a credible profit-maximizing 
strategy, as pointed out by  Ordover and Saloner (1989), among others. 
First, the foreclosing firm must have significant market power. Like preda- 
tory pricing, engaging in exclusionary practices is costly for the foreclosing 
firm. Thus, in order for the payoff of an exclusion strategy to be positive 
and to exceed that of an entry accommodation strategy, the firm must 
have a profitable market that can be protected from competition. Second, 
the foreclosing firm must be willing to pay more than the foreclosed firm 
in foreclosing the market. Otherwise, the foreclosure will  be blocked or 
undone by the targeted firm. Third, the supply of the foreclosed resource 
14. Vertical restraints  may be  used strategically to raise a rival’s cost, in particular for 
exclusionary reasons (see Ordover and Saloner  1989; Ordover, Saloner, and Salop  1990; 
Tirole 1990). 
15. Vertical restraints can be efficiency increasing in various ways (see Katz 1989). They 
facilitate smooth information  flow across related parties and enable its efficient use. They 
also encourage investment by controlling ex post opportunism. They help internalize vertical 
or horizontal externalities such as double marginalization and free-riding on investment in 
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must be inelastic. Competitive output markets make the first two condi- 
tions unlikely to hold, while competitive input markets make the third 
condition unlikely to hold. 
In trabrand Competition 
Vertical restraints such as territorial restraints may be used to price dis- 
criminate among national markets. Although the output effect of price 
discrimination can be positive, especially if  such price discrimination is 
necessary to induce a firm to serve each national market, international 
price differentiation per se is welfare reducing. The welfare cost due to inter- 
national price differences becomes larger as such differences  become larger. 
Therefore, competition policy measures that prevent the emergence of a 
high degree of international price differentiation can be welfare improv- 
ing.I6 Such measures include regulation of the strength of territorial re- 
strictions imposed on distributors by a producer and prohibition of a firm 
from interfering with parallel imports or reverse imports. 
The welfare impact  of price discrimination  on a foreign country de- 
pends on whether the firm sets a higher price abroad than at home, which 
in turn depends on consumers’ willingness to pay and the degree of com- 
petition abroad relative to those at home. If a firm discriminates in favor 
of foreign consumers, the foreign country tends to gain from such business 
practices. The benefit of a lower price to its consumers tends to dominate 
the losses of competing firms. Thus international price discrimination can 
have a positive international spillover. 
2.2  Recent Development of Japanese Competition Policy 
2.2.1  Trade Cartels and International Division of  Markets 
Trade cartels that are approved by the Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry under the Export and Import Transaction Law” are exempt 
from the application of the Antimonopoly Law of  Japan. Export cartels 
have accounted for more than half of the exempted cartels in terms of 
numbers (see fig. 2.2 and table 2.1). The number of trade cartels, however, 
16. However, there may be good cases for price discrimination for goods embodying a 
large amount of R&D expenditure and among markets with significant differences of in- 
come. In the former case, price discrimination may  be useful for expanding the areas for 
technology application, given low marginal cost, and the profits gained from price discrimi- 
nation tend to encourage R&D (see Hausman and Mackie-Mason 1988). In the latter case, 
prohibiting price discrimination has the significant danger that the firm will choose to aban- 
don the markets with lower incomes. 
17. The law was enacted in 1952. Its objectives are to prevent unfair export transactions 
and to establish orderly export and import transactions. Unfair export transactions include 
infringing on intellectual property rights in importing countries and giving false indication 
of origin. International Trade Aspects of Competition Policy  63 
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Fig. 2.2  Number of cartels exempted from the Antimonopoly Law 
Note: Import is indicated by  the area between small and medium-size enterprises (SME) 
and export. 
Table 2.1  Number of Cartels Exempted from the Antimonopoly Law in Japan 
1 April  1 March 
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Small and medium-size enterprises 
Fishery 
Transportation 















Source: JFTC (various years). 
Note: Regional cartels in the same product are counted only once 
has declined substantially over time. As of March  1997, the number of 
trade cartels was five, of which four were export cartels.18  The significant 
reduction in trade cartels reflects, first, a general reduction in the scope 
of exempted cartels. The Japanese government has reduced the scope of 
18. The four export cartels covered textiles (quantity) to certain destinations, ceramics 
(design), and pearls (quality). The single import cartel covered silk products imported from 
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exemptions since the latter half of the 1980s within the context of regula- 
tory reform. Regulatory reform has gained new momentum recently. In 
1995 a cabinet decision was reached that exempted cartels be abolished in 
principle by the end of FY 1998. Accordingly, the exemptions for import 
cartels, associations of small traders, and domestic cartels for export re- 
striction were abolished in 1998. 
Second, the recent reduction in trade cartels also reflects the prohibition 
and phaseout of voluntary export restraints (VERs), as agreed in the Uru- 
guay Round. Export cartels were  an important means of implementing 
VERs and export restrictions under the Multi-Fiber Arrangement. Ac- 
cording to a Japanese Fair Trade Commission report (JFTC 1991), pre- 
venting trade frictions was the main objective of two-thirds of export car- 
tels (twenty out of thirty) in  1991.19 
Trade cartels that are not approved by the government are violations of 
the Antimonopoly Law, even if they do not directly affect the home mar- 
ket. Recently, the JFTC caught such a case: the cartel coordinated by  an 
industrial cooperative to fix the domestic wholesale prices as well  as the 
export prices of its member’s products.20  Moreover, participation in inter- 
national cartels per se is also prohibited by the Antimonopoly Law.2’ 
2.2.2  Prohibition of Cartels and Regulation of Mergers 
Prohibition of  Cartels 
The Japanese government has also strengthened its enforcement of the 
Antimonopoly Law  against cartels by  increasing the administrative sur- 
charge on firms engaged in cartels, by  more actively invoking the pro- 
cedure for criminal prosecution, and  by  strengthening its investigative 
capacity (see table 2.2). The administrative surcharge was increased sig- 
nificantly in 1991. As a result, the surcharge on a manufacturing firm par- 
ticipating in a cartel was raised from 2 percent of its sales to 6 percent of 
its sales.2z  The average annual surcharge levied from FY 1991 to FY 1995 
after the increase was 4.5  times as much as that before the increase if we 
exclude FY 1990, during which the cement industry was subject to a very 
large surcharge, and 2.2 times as much if  we  include that year. Criminal 
prosecution has been more frequently invoked. There have been four cases 
19. Countervailing an import monopoly was another objective (seven out of thirty cartels). 
20. In  1994 the national mosaic tile industrial cooperative was ordered by  the JFTC to 
stop the practice of price fixing in both markets and was levied a surcharge. 
21. One major case uncovered by the JFTC was an international cartel between Japanese 
synthetic fiber producers and European competitors in 1972, which agreed on the complete 
restraint  of exports to each other’s market as well  as on quantity ceilings and minimum 
export prices for other markets, excluding that of the United States. 
22. The surcharge of 6 percent is levied for up to three years of sales, with exceptions for 
retail businesses (2 percent), wholesale businesses (1 percent), and small and medium-size 
firms (3 percent with a further exception of 1 percent for distribution businesses). Table 2.2  Antimonopoly Enforcement against Cartels in the 1% 
Fiscal Year 
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1990-96 
Number of cartels acted against  13  19  30  24  21  24  15  146 
Total surcharge (billion yen)  12.6  2.0  2.7  3.6  5.7  6.4  7.4  40.4 
Criminal prosecution  0  1  1  0  1  1  1  5 
Note: In addition to the legal measures for injunction  and for levying surcharges, the JFTC issues warnings and provides guidance in cases where not 
enough evidence can be found to establish violation of the Antimonopoly Law. In FY 1995 alone the JFTC issued five warnings and sixteen guidances with 
respect to suspected cartels (twelve against price cartels and twelve against bidrigging). 66  Sadao Nagaoka 
from FY 1990 to FY 1995, compared with no cases in the 1980~.~~  In ad- 
dition, legal exemptions from the Antimonopoly Law have been signifi- 
cantly streamlined. In particular, it was decided in March 1998 that the 
Antimonopoly Law would be amended within three years to abolish ex- 
emptions for recession cartels and rationalization cartels. 
Table 2.3 shows, by industry and by customer, the number of cartels as 
well as the size of surcharges levied on members of cartels that were sub- 
ject to legal sanctions by the JFTC from 1989 to 1995. In terms of indus- 
trial sectors, the manufacturing industry accounts for 31  percent of  the 
cases and 60 percent  of  the surcharges. The construction  industry ac- 
counts for 36 percent of the cases and 24 percent of the surcharges. The 
service and distribution sectors account for the rest. The government and 
other public bodies were the customers in more than half of the cartel 
cases. Bid rigging was the dominant form of cartel for public procurement 
contracts, and the construction industry contained the main offenders in 
bid rigging.24  In the case of private customers, price cartels were the domi- 
nant form of cartel. Cartels in the manufacturing sector accounted for 
about half of the cartels selling to private customers. 
Regulation of  Mergers and Acquisitions 
The JFTC has been relatively restrictive against mergers and acquisi- 
tions, although the new Merger Guidelines of 1999 indicate a significant 
liberalization of JFTC policy. A 25 percent domestic market share used to 
be regarded as a critical line with regard to the necessity of close scrutiny 
of competitive conditions. The market definition used by the JFTC has 
been either the national market  or a regional market within Japan. Al- 
though  it  does consider  imports in the evaluation  of competition, the 
JFTC has never used the global market as the defined scope of the market. 
It has not approved the efficiency defense for mergers either. 
Table 2.4 shows the domestic market  shares of merged firms for the 
largest merger cases from 1985 to 1995. In most mergers the market share 
of the postmerger firm did not substantially exceed the 25 percent market 
share line. In three cases mergers that achieved more than 30 percent mar- 
ket share were approved; however, the circumstances were exceptional. In 
one declining market demand and low entry cost were judged to justify the 
23. The only major case that led to criminal prosecution before the 1990s was that of a 
cartel in the oil-refining industry in 1974. 
24. We can point out three reasons why bid rigging has been prevalent in Japanese public 
procurements. First, government organizations are much less concerned with cost minimiza- 
tion than they are with the smooth implementation of the budgeted projects. Second, defec- 
tion from a cartel is much easy to detect in the case of government contracts because the 
government is obliged to disclose publicly the winner of the bid. As the theory of cartel 
stability suggests, a high detection rate of defection helps to maintain a cartel. Third, until 
the recent choice of open tendering, tenders had been invited only from nominated bidders. Table 2.3  Japanese Cartels by Industry, Type, and Customer, FY 1989-95 
Industry 
Public Procurement (number of cases)  Private Procurement (number of cases)  Total Cases 
Bid  Price  Bid  Price  Surcharge” 
Rigging  Cartel  Others  Rigging  Cartel  Others  Numbera  (billion yen) 
Manufacturing  14  2  0  1  25  0  42  (31)  19.7  (60) 
Distribution  4  0  0  0  9  1  14  (10)  2.5  (8) 
Construction  48  1  1  0  0  0  50  (36)  8.0  (24) 
Service and others  11  1  0  0  14  5  31  (23)  2.5  (8) 
Total  77  4  1  1  48  6  137 (100)  32.7 (100) 
Source: Author’s estimate based on JFTC (various years). 
Note: The numbers of cases for which surcharges were levied up to the end of FY 1995 are 37 for manufacturing,  10 for distribution, 37 for construction, 
and 23 for service and other industry. 
aNumbers in parentheses are industry percentages of totals. 68  Sadao Nagaoka 
Table 2.4  Market Shares of Major Horizontally Merged Firms, FY 1985-95 
Market Share  Number of Cases 
Less than or equal to 20%  11 
Less than or equal to 25%  6 
Less than or equal to 30%  3 
More than 30%  3 
Unknown  2 
Total  25 
Source: JFTC (various years). 
Note: This table covers only major horizontal cases having the national market as market, 
as reported in the JFTC annual reports. When the JFTC examines several layers of markets, 
this table adopts the broadest market. 
merger. In another a joint venture between the leading Japanese beer maker 
and a large foreign beer maker was approved because of regulatory restric- 
tions on the expansion of liquor shops in Japan, and only for ten years. 
Moreover, when the market share of the postmerger firm was expected 
to exceed the 25 percent line substantially, the JFTC often asked the merg- 
ing firms to take measures that would limit their market power as a pre- 
condition for approval. For example, in 1995 the JFTC asked one chemical 
company undertaking consolidation to divest its shareholding in the joint 
production  company. It asked another chemical company undertaking 
consolidation to liquidate its joint sales agreement with a foreign, poten- 
tially competing company. 
2.2.3  Vertical Restraints 
Overall Regulation 
Vertical restraints have been regulated in Japan mainly under the unfair 
trade practices section of the Antimonopoly Law because it covers a range 
of business practices wider than attempted monopolization. Unfair trade 
practices can cover such business practices as resale price maintenance, 
joint refusal to deal, below-cost sales and price discrimination, exclusive 
dealing, and territorial restriction.  Similar to the policy practices in the 
United States or the European Union, such conduct as exclusive dealing 
is not illegal per se. Legality in Japan depends on how “influential” the 
party requiring such a contract is as well as on how much such a practice 
constrains the business activities of competitors. Major exceptions in this 
respect are resale price maintenance, joint refusal to deal, and sales sub- 
stantially below cost, which are illegal in principle, irrespective of the mar- 
ket position of the firm engaging in these activities. Focusing on distribu- 
tion, the JFTC issued detailed  guidelines on distribution and business 
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Table 2.5  Unfair Business Practices Subject to JFTC Action, FY 1991-95 
Type of Unfair Business Practice  Number of Cases 
Resale price maintenance  20 
Abuse of stronger bargaining position 
Requirement or exclusionary contract  24 
Business interference  5 
2 
Other  I 
Total  58 
Source: JFTC (various years). 
Note: Actions include warnings, where violations were suspected but not enough evidence 
was obtained. The above numbers do not include unfair practices conducted by  business 
associations that were subject to JFTC action. 
Table 2.5 shows recent JFTC actions according to type of unfair busi- 
ness  practice. Resale price maintenance  accounts  for one-third  of  the 
cases. Requirement or exclusionary contracts, such as exclusive dealing, 
account for another third. Sales restriction in international licensing can 
directly affect international trade. The JFTC acted in two international li- 
censing cases in 1995, where there were agreements between Japanese firms 
and a Taiwanese firm that restricted sales by  the Taiwanese firm in Japan 
even after the expiration of the licensing contract. 
Exclusive Dealing 
Exclusive dealing between manufacturers and distributors in Japan has 
sometimes been regarded as a market access barrier.25  One of the main 
issues in the recent automobile trade dispute is the “closed” distribution 
system in Japan. In Japan all nine automakers have developed their own 
distribution networks, and most dealers specialize in selling the automo- 
biles of a particular automaker. Consequently, multiple-franchise dealers 
have been almost nonexistent, except for those arranged by Japanese auto- 
makers themselves.26  Similarly, the central competition policy issue in the 
recent film dispute was the relationship between the largest Japanese film 
producer and its first tier of wholesalers. These seven distributors currently 
sell only the films of this maker.27 
25. In addition, Tilton (1996) points out that refusal to deal has often been used to restrain 
imports by  Japanese firms in the basic material industry, although refusal to deal per se is 
not illegal. 
26. The situation has been similar in Europe, where most dealers have single-franchise 
agreements with major automakers. In contrast, around 30 percent of dealers had multiple- 
franchise dealerships in the United  States in  1989, although single-franchise dealers were 
dominant in the United States too until the 1960s. 
27. On the other hand, the second tier of wholesalers, who buy films from the first tier of 
wholesalers for resale to small retail shops, do not specialize in handling a single brand 
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Exclusive dealing contracts, when required by  an influential firm,28  are 
deemed an unfair business practice in Japan when they make it difficult 
for competitors to find alternative distribution channels. For example, the 
exclusive dealing contract required by  a firm that possessed two-thirds of 
the domestic market was judged by  the JFTC to be an unfair business 
contract. As for the automobile industry, the JFTC guided the two largest 
Japanese automakers to abolish the clause requiring exclusive dealing in 
distribution contracts in 1979. In 1991 all domestic automakers decided to 
abolish the prior consultation clause for distributors in selling other mak- 
ers’ models, in response to the JFTC’s guideline on distribution. Thus pro- 
ducers who have relatively large market shares cannot bind distributors 
with contracts that bar them from dealing with competitors in Japan.29 
From an international perspective, it is not the case that Japanese com- 
petition policy has been more favorable to exclusive dealing requirements 
by producers. In the United States the efficiency-improving  nature of ex- 
clusive dealing is recognized, so that such practices are likely to be treated 
as illegal only if a firm with significant market power exercises them.30  In 
Europe block exemptions have authorized exclusive dealing in automobile 
sales and other industries. 
Parallel Imports 
In the application of Japanese competition policy, not only resale price 
maintenance but also nonprice vertical restraints, which directly reduce 
price competition among distributors, have been deemed illegal without 
regard to the market position of the firm. Consequently, such conduct by 
sole import agents as asking foreign suppliers to take measures to close 
supply channels to parallel importers has been deemed to be a violation 
of the Antimonopoly Law. In recent years the JFTC took up several cases 
in this field involving imports of tablewares, pianos, and bags. 
2.3  Implications for International Cooperation in Competition Policy 
2.3.1  Welfare Measures 
In considering international cooperation in competition policy, the criti- 
cal issue is what welfare measure is to be used in evaluating private anti- 
28. An influential firm as defined by the JFTC is a firm with more than 10 percent of the 
domestic market or a firm ranked in the top three in terms of market share. 
29. The use of financial measures with an exclusionary effect, such as highly progressive 
rebates, is also being restricted in Japan. 
30. In addition, market definition in the United States is often broader than in Japan. Two 
United States courts recently ruled that the largest film producer in the United States does 
not have market power despite its dominant market share in the U.S. market because the 
market was judged to be global. Consequently, the two consent decrees issued by  the U.S. 
Fair Trade Commission, which had restricted such distribution practices as selling private- 
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competitive practices. The appropriate  measure  is  global welfare,  and 
global output as its surrogate. A particular business behavior is anticom- 
petitive domestically if it reduces the domestic supply of an industry. Simi- 
larly, a particular business behavior is anticompetitive internationally if it 
reduces the global supply of that industry. 
Why  should a global welfare criterion be used instead of  a national 
welfare criterion? National welfare implies the adoption of different stan- 
dards of competition policy with regard to anticompetitive behavior in 
the home market versus that in international markets or with regard to 
the behavior of foreign firms versus that of home firms. One example of 
such a policy is prohibiting cartels in the domestic market while allowing 
them in export markets. Another example is regarding any business prac- 
tices in foreign markets as anticompetitive if the exports of home firms 
are constrained. 
Such discriminatory application of  competition policy has two major 
problems. First, it may undermine domestic standards. The historical evo- 
lution of the principle of competition policy from protecting competitors 
to protecting competition can be negatively affected. Second, when a for- 
eign country adopts a similar policy, the national welfare of both countries 
can decline, just as optimal tariff policy is in fact not optimal given similar 
foreign behavior. The use of competition policy as a rent-shifting policy is 
self-destructive in these senses. 
The guiding principle for securing consistency with global efficiency is 
to establish national treatment in the application of competition policy for 
domestic and foreign firms as well as for domestic and foreign consumers. 
Currently, national competition policy does not necessarily respect this 
principle, and the danger exists that political pressure to use antitrust pol- 
icy in order to expand market access can further widen the gap.” National 
treatment has several important implications: 
1. Extension of home competition policy to export cartels. 
2.  Prohibition of import cartels. Exceptions, however, may be granted 
in  cases where  the  import  cartel is  formed as a countervailing device 
against an export cartel. 
3. Application of the same competition policy standard to foreign and 
domestic firms. In the case of extraterritorial application of competition 
policy, the same standards will be used for foreign firms as for home firms. 
Once national treatment is established and substantive standards for 
competition policy are agreed upon internationally, each economy will be 
31.  The U.S.  government is authorized by  the Congress to apply its antitrust law in an 
extraterritorial manner to foreign business practices that hinder the export expansion of US. 
firms (Foreign Trade Antitrust  Improvement Act of  1982). It has not  yet  been clarified 
whether in applying this provision the U.S. government has to meet the same antitrust stan- 
dards as those applied to domestic firms or whether it can use separate standards just for 
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willing to delegate the enforcement of competition policy to the country 
that can most efficiently investigate and enforce corrective actions, which 
would typically be the country where firms are located. It will thus encour- 
age the development of a division of labor in enforcing competition policy, 
avoiding duplication and inconsistency in enforcement efforts. 
2.3.2  Priorities for International Cooperation 
High priority for international cooperation in competition policy could 
be given to the regulation of private anticompetitive conduct that has neg- 
ative as well as large international effects. As discussed in section 2.2, trade 
cartels, including international cartels, do  have negative international spill- 
overs. The degree of spillover depends on the international market power of 
the cartel. The same thing applies to mergers that create international mar- 
ket power. In contrast, domestic cartels per se do not have substantial 
negative international spillovers. 
As  for  vertical  practices,  what  should  be  addressed  are  eficiency- 
reducing vertical practices. The degree of spillover depends on whether the 
market foreclosed by  a firm is large in the international context. For both 
horizontal practices and vertical restraints, it is clear that a larger econ- 
omy has more responsibility for controlling the anticompetitive behavior 
of  its firms and for keeping its markets competitive. Firms located in a 
relatively small country are less likely to have international market power. 
Moreover, it is a time-consuming process to develop effective competition 
policy institutions (see Scherer 1994). Thus, international agreements on 
cooperation in competition policy may be framed so that differential treat- 
ment can be provided to small developing countries. 
2.4  Conclusions 
Competition policy, including its absence, can have important interna- 
tional spillovers. However, the recent focus on competition policy from a 
“market access” perspective can be misleading. The anticompetitive be- 
havior that can have the most clearly negative international spillover is an 
export cartel. Export cartels, however,  do not constrain market access. 
Moreover, export cartels or similar export-restraining arrangements were 
often used in the past to ameliorate trade frictions. Pure domestic cartels 
tend to improve market access and harm primarily the country that toler- 
ates such arrangements, although when a domestic cartel is in a vertical 
relationship with international trade it can restrain international trade and 
reduce foreign welfare too. Vertical restraints can constrain market access 
and can have negative international spillovers. However, we  have to distin- 
guish efficiency-reducing vertical restraints from efficiency-improving re- 
straints. 
The Japanese government has substantially strengthened its competi- 
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empted from the application of the Antimonopoly Law, including trade 
cartels, and in its enforcement against cartels. On the other hand, Japanese 
competition policy used to be fairly restrictive toward mergers and acqui- 
sitions, and Japanese policy toward vertical restraints has not been signifi- 
cantly different from that in the United States. The recent change toward 
stronger  enforcement  of  competition  policy,  especially against  cartels, 
should be highly beneficial to the Japanese economy. But on the other 
hand, it is not clear whether this policy change can have a substantial im- 
pact on market access. 
In promoting international cooperation in competition policy, it is im- 
portant to have national treatment as the guiding principle, in order to 
avoid the danger of using competition policy as a means for rent shifting. 
Priority in international cooperation could  be given to controlling  the 
anticompetitive behavior of firms with international market power. 
Although this paper  has focused on competition policy in  a narrow 
sense, it is very important to recognize that many WTO issues remain, 
the resolution of which would contribute much more to the development 
of competitive markets than will cooperation in competition policy itself. 
Unrestricted international trade and investment will make markets more 
competitive, so that sustaining cartels and other anticompetitive behaviors 
will become more difficult. A major issue in this regard is the reform of 
antidumping rules. Although antidumping measures have sometimes been 
defended by their proponents as substitutes for competition policy abroad 
or as transitory measures while markets remain nonintegrated, both the 
guiding principles as well as the actual practices of antidumping measures 
are widely divergent from those for competition policy interventions. The 
second area is the introduction of domestic and foreign competition into 
public  utility  industries,  such  as  electricity, where vertically integrated 
firms used to supply monopolistically in many countries. The third area is 
the reform of government procurement agreements. Currently, only a lim- 
ited number of WTO member countries participate in the WTO agreement 
on government procurement. Furthermore, the experiences of many sig- 
natory countries, including Japan, suggest that public procurement is vul- 
nerable to bid rigging. Thus there is a substantial efficiency gain from more 
competition in this area too. 
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Comment  Anne 0. Krueger 
In this paper, Sadao Nagaoka makes two important contributions: first, 
he analyzes competition policy and the ways in which  such anticompeti- 
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tive behavior as cartels, vertical restraints of trade, and predatory pricing 
can affect the welfare of home and foreign countries. Second, he then con- 
siders how Japanese competition policy has evolved in recent years. 
I have little to add with regard to the first contribution, as Nagaoka’s 
analysis covers the main issues nicely. He does point to two facts that must 
be borne in mind in considering competition policy: (1) predatory pricing 
has been  relatively rare internationally except when governments them- 
selves have undertaken policies that permitted it, and (2) even when gov- 
ernments break up export cartels (which should be to international, as 
well as national, advantage), other governments have then exercised their 
antidumping regulations in ways that have rendered the potential welfare 
gains nugatory. As an example of the first case, consider the United States, 
which has prohibited the formation of  domestic cartels but encouraged 
the formation of export cartels. As an example of the second, Nagaoka 
notes that VERs were encouraged by  importing countries and led to the 
formation of  export cartels, especially in Japan. When the VERs were 
removed and the Japanese government broke up the export cartels, there 
were suits by  importing countries on grounds of antidumping at the re- 
duced export prices. If one considers the extent of anticompetitive behav- 
ior in international markets in the past several decades, however, there is 
little doubt that government-imposed anticompetitive behavior through 
VERs was a major source of welfare loss. 
The discussion of the evolution of Japanese competition policy is also 
very  useful. It is an irony of history that the United States, after World 
War 11, sought competition policy in Germany and Japan in order to keep 
German and Japanese industries weak! Especially in light of  the impor- 
tance modern regulatory theory places on maintaining competition, this 
earlier thinking is quite remarkable. 
One point that Nagaoka alludes to, on which I would  have liked to 
have heard more, is the role of international trade in bringing about more 
competition. It seems self-evident that opening domestic markets to for- 
eign  competition  greatly  increases  competitive pressures on  domestic 
firms. Likewise, exporters selling in third markets almost surely (except in 
the case of international cartels) face more competition than they would 
selling in protected domestic markets. In terms of dealing with integrating 
competition policy among countries, I would therefore conjecture that 
there was less urgency to worrying about market shares of national mar- 
kets for exporters than for producers in home markets (where the presence 
of foreign competition would obviously reduce the share of domestic pro- 
ducers). Yet most discussions of market shares seem to focus on shares of 
national markets held by  domestic firms: does not this practice require 
amendment? 
I would like to close by endorsing another point made by Nagaoka: that 
is, it is important that any international competition policy use national 
treatment as a guiding principle so that it cannot be used as a means for 76  Sadao Nagaoka 
rent shifting. Nagaoka correctly urges attention to areas where firms have 
international market power and correctly notes that restricting the abuse 
of antidumping regulations would probably do more to improve the com- 
petitive environment than can possibly be achieved by  coordination of 
competition policy. Would that this message could be received and under- 
stood by politicians! 
Comment  Chong-Hyun Nam 
I enjoyed reading Nagaoka’s paper and think it makes a nice companion 
piece to chapter 1, by  Roger Noll. While Noll’s paper deals with broader 
issues of competition policy, including regulatory reforms, Nagaoka’s pa- 
per focuses on narrower issues, such as cartels, mergers, and vertical re- 
straints. 
I have only a few comments to make. Beforehand, however,  I think it 
may be useful to ask again why  competition policy has recently emerged 
as a prominent agenda for a future round of  multilateral negotiation at 
the WTO, and what we  can expect from it. I do not know exact answers 
to these questions, but I can think of a couple of reasons why  the subject 
of competition policy has gained momentum in recent years. 
One is based on the fact that despite continued liberalization of trade- 
restricting border measures under the GATT system during the postwar 
period, its expected effect on trade expansion has not been fully realized 
in some countries. Many have argued that this is largely due to anticom- 
petitive nonborder measures that have worked in these countries as a de- 
terrent to market access for foreign exporters, and Japan has been fre- 
quently named as supporting evidence for their argument. They indicate 
that Japan’s import-to-GDP ratio is the lowest among the OECD nations, 
about half of  that for the United States, while  the discrepancy between 
Japan’s current and purchasing-power-parity-based income is the largest 
among the OECD nations in both absolute and relative terms. I suspect, 
therefore, that the main impetus behind the recent competition policy 
drive is U.S. and EU frustration at failing to penetrate the Japanese mar- 
kets that are alleged to be the most open at the border among the OECD 
nations. There seems to be an expectation that once anticompetitive do- 
mestic regulations and business practices-including  closed distribution 
systems-are  lifted from Japan, that country can provide the world with 
vast and unexplored markets. I am not sure what kind of quantitative 
importance may be attached to this sort of belief, but I do think the wel- 
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fare gains to be reaped from a global competition policy can be sizable, 
especially when regulatory reforms are included in it. 
Another reason for the recent prominence of competition policy is the 
fact that the so-called unfair trade rules currently in operation under the 
WTO system are utterly inadequate from the viewpoint of competition. 
They tend to discourage competition rather than promote it. At present, 
trade-related competition policies under the WTO system are reflected in 
antidumping  and countervailing  duty  rules. These  rules,  however,  are 
fraught with so many flaws both in theory and in practice that they have 
been heavily abused, most notably by the United States and the European 
Union. Replacement of these rules by an agreed upon global competition 
policy, or an agreement to use national treatment for importers, would 
significantly reduce trade friction and the potential for protection through 
antidumping measures. 
Now let me turn to a few comments on some specific conclusions in 
Nagaoka’s paper. First of all, I am puzzled by Nagaoka’s conclusion that 
the recent competition policy drive is “misleading” in that it is focused 
more on market access concerns than on export cartels, arguing that ex- 
port cartels deserve greater attention because they have the most clearly 
negative international spillovers. There is no doubt that export cartels dis- 
tort trade, incurring economic costs, but it seems to me that they are not 
likely to be quantitatively significant compared to the economic costs asso- 
ciated with other anticompetitive domestic measures. Given a relatively 
open and competitive world trading system, as we have today, there seems 
to be little room left for trade cartels to exploit. Thus it seems to me that 
improving market  access on a multilateral, reciprocal basis should and 
would be a major concern of the competition policy drive, and for good 
reason. 
1 am also troubled to understand Nagaoka’s conclusion that domestic 
cartels are likely to increase market access with positive international spill- 
overs. It may hold true in his simple model, but not in reality in general, 
I suppose. To be realistic, domestic cartels are unlikely to survive long 
unless they are protected from import competition by the government. In 
this circumstance, domestic cartels are likely to generate negative interna- 
tional spillovers instead because import protection limits market access 
for foreign exporters. But there can be cases in which domestic cartels 
come into being under natural import barriers or under some sort of do- 
mestic “regulatory capture,” if  I may borrow terminology from Noll’s pa- 
per.  Service industries  such  as  distribution,  transportation,  communi- 
cations, or finance may belong to such a category. A global competition 
policy including regulatory reforms seems to be most wanted in these cir- 
cumstances  because  services are increasingly becoming  internationally 
tradable goods these days. 
Finally, I wonder whether we  will ever be able to design and achieve a 78  Sadao Nagaoka 
comprehensive global competition policy that can be accepted and admin- 
istered by  individual nations with diverse economic structures, histories, 
and customs. But if we  could have one, the most important beneficiaries 
would  likely  be  small,  outward-oriented  developing  countries,  which 
would enjoy improved market access as well as fewer threats from admin- 
istered protection. In this regard,  contrary to Nagaoka’s conclusion,  I 
think any differential treatment toward developing countries in making a 
global competition policy is neither necessary nor desirable. We know all 
too well how the special and differential treatment provided to developing 
countries under the GATT  system eventually disserved the interests of 
developing countries. 